Written by Fall 2025 M-VETS Student Advisor Jacoby Warner.
I. Introduction: A Cautious Win for Veteran Law
Practitioners representing veterans in disability retirement cases are accustomed to hard limits. Correction boards have often treated disability retirement as unavailable when a client’s separation was the result of misconduct, invoking statutory authority as a threshold bar rather than considering the medical merits. In LaBonte v. United States, the Army Board for Correction of Military Records and the Court of Federal Claims initially concluded that 10 U.S.C. § 1552(f) foreclosed disability retirement relief, believing they were without authority to change the servicemember’s reason for separation because there was a court-martial conviction.[1]
However, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in LaBonte v. United States corrected both prior decisions, holding that correction boards are not categorically barred from granting disability retirement merely because a servicemember’s separation involved misconduct or a court-martial.[2] The Court’s rejection of the government’s jurisdictional theory means that, when medical unfitness predates misconduct, the review board need not set aside a court-martial conviction, thereby allowing it to exercise its statutory authority.[3] LaBonte changed the litigation terrain without guaranteeing relief. LaBonte requires correction boards and reviewing courts to review the merits of disability claims that would have previously been dismissed for lack of authority.[4]
Read alongside Doyon v. United States, which emphasizes that statutory “liberal consideration” must be meaningfully applied rather than nominally acknowledged.[5] LaBonte reflects the judiciary’s reluctance to accept categorical reasoning in PTSD based correction cases, even as courts remain unwilling to substitute their judgment for that of military boards. This blog post examines LaBonte’s effect on a practitioner’s perspective, focusing on how the decision should be used to frame claims and preserve error reasoning without exceeding its reach or substance.
II. What Does Labonte Actually Mean for Veterans and What It Doesn’t
The most important contribution of LaBonte is not that it expanded entitlement to disability retirement, but that it corrected a misapprehension about correction board authority.[6] Before LaBonte, review boards frequently treated disability retirement as legally unavailable once a servicemember’s separation followed a court-martial, reasoning that granting such relief would necessarily require setting aside the conviction itself. [7] The Federal Circuit rejected that premise.[8]a.
a. What LaBonte Changed
LaBonte clarified that military correction boards are not categorically barred from granting disability retirement merely because a servicemember’s separation involved misconduct or a court-martial.[9] The court explained that recognizing a servicemember’s medical unfitness predating misconduct does not require vacating or disturbing a court-martial conviction and therefore does not exceed the board’s statutory authority under 10 U.S.C. § 1552.[10]
In practice, LaBonte forecloses a threshold defense that would end cases before they began. The assertion that the board simply lacks the power to consider disability retirement whenever a punitive discharge is involved.[11] LaBonte shifts judicial review away from jurisdictional dismissal and toward an analysis of a review board’s analysis.[12] Where boards once relied on categorical interpretations of statutory limits, courts must now assess whether the board reasonably exercised its authority.[13]
b. What LaBonte Did Not Change
At the same time, LaBonte is careful not to overstep.[14] The decision is careful not to overstep and does not hold that misconduct is excused by PTSD or TBI. Additionally, it does not presume medical unfitness simply because a veteran later received a VA disability rating.[15] The Federal Circuit did not order disability retirement, reweigh medical evidence, or diminish the deference owed to military boards in assessing fitness and entitlement to benefits.[16]
Further, LaBonte does not force review boards to disregard the procedural posture of a servicemember’s separation.[17] Review boards are free to determine a veteran’s fitness at the relevant time.[18] LaBonte does not require a particular outcome; instead, it turns the analysis to merit rather than authority.[19]
c. The Practical Boundary LaBonte Draws
Properly understood, LaBonte draws a clear boundary. It removes a jurisdictional shortcut, but it does not relax the substantive standards governing disability retirement.[20] For practitioners, the case opens the door to merits review; it does not guarantee what happens once inside.[21] Claims that rely on LaBonte without developing a persuasive medical and factual record are unlikely to succeed. Claims that use LaBonte to force boards to confront that record, however, now stand on firmer legal ground.[22]
III. The Value of Labonte: Reframing the Legal Question
For practitioners, the practical impact of LaBonte is not that it lowers the substantive bar for disability retirement, but that it changes how claims must be framed—and how errors must be preserved. [23] After LaBonte, the central task is no longer convincing a correction board to consider disability retirement in the face of misconduct.[24] The task now is forcing the board to explain, on the merits, why it declines to grant relief in a particular case.[25]
a. Shifting the Focus from Authority to Timing
Effective use of LaBonte requires careful attention to timing. The Federal Circuit’s reasoning rests on the distinction between misconduct as a basis for separation and medical unfitness that may have existed before that misconduct occurred.[26] Practitioners should therefore frame claims around whether the servicemember met medical retention standards at the relevant time—not around whether the misconduct was understandable, mitigated, or excusable.[27]
Arguments seeking to challenge a court-martial, minimize culpability, or reframe the misconduct as justified risk muddying the legal question LaBonte addresses.[28] A better approach is to focus on developing the medical and factual record to demonstrate that the disability existed and rendered the servicemember unfit before the events that ultimately triggered separation.[29]
b. Forcing Merits Engagement—and Preserving Error
LaBonte is a valuable tool for a compelling merits review. When the board has authority to refer a case to the Disability Evaluation System, it must provide an explanation for denying referral.[30] References to misconduct, conclusory medical summaries, or unexplained rejection of favorable evidence are no longer insulated by claims of statutory incapacity.[31] From a litigation perspective, this creates opportunities to preserve error by:
- Identifying the precise date on which the servicemember allegedly remained fit for duty.
- Explaining how conflicting medical evidence was weighed.
- Addressing whether referral to a disability evaluation system should have occurred earlier.
When military personnel fail in any of these areas, there may be a valid claim for arbitrary and capricious review.[32]c.
c. Using LaBonte Without Overreaching
LaBonte should be deployed with restraint. Courts remain wary of arguments that appear to transform correction-board review into de novo adjudication.[33] Overreliance on LaBonte as a merits mandate risks undermining credibility and inviting deferential affirmance.[34] The most effective use of LaBonte is to eliminate denials of lack of authority, allowing advocates to focus on carefully developing the record, regulatory standards, and medical evidence to challenge the board’s reasoning.[35] In this sense, LaBonte rewards disciplined lawyering rather than aggressive rhetoric.
d. The Reinforcing Role of Doyon
Doyon v. United States reinforces this approach by emphasizing that statutory requirements—such as “liberal consideration” for PTSD- and TBI-related claims—must be applied in substance, not merely recited.[36] Together, LaBonte and Doyon signal that while courts will not substitute their judgment for that of military boards, they will insist that boards follow the law they are given and explain their decisions.[37]
IV. Doyon as a Companion Case: Process Matters as Much as Power
If LaBonte clarifies what correction boards may do, Doyon v. United States clarifies how they must do it. The Federal Circuit’s decision in Doyon reinforces that statutory protections for veterans—particularly the requirement of “liberal consideration” under 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h)—are not satisfied by rote acknowledgment or conclusory reasoning.[38]
In Doyon, the court rejected the government’s attempt to narrow liberal consideration to discharge characterization alone, holding instead that the statute and implementing guidance apply to requests to change narrative reasons for separation and related record corrections.[39] More importantly, the court made clear that liberal consideration is a substantive obligation.[40] Boards must engage with the evidence presented, including lay testimony and post-service medical diagnoses, and must explain how that evidence was weighed.[41]
Read together, LaBonte and Doyon reflect a consistent judicial message. Correction boards cannot avoid difficult questions by asserting lack of authority—LaBonte—nor can they discharge statutory duties through formalistic recitation—Doyon.[42] Authority and process are intertwined: boards must decide cases within their authority and do so using the standards Congress and the Department of Defense have prescribed.[43]
For practitioners, Doyon supplies the procedural backbone that gives LaBonte practical force.[44] A board that acknowledges authority but fails to apply liberal consideration meaningfully has not complied with the law, and that failure is subject to judicial review.[45]
V. How Practitioners Should Use Labonte: Optimistically but Carefully
Used correctly, LaBonte is a powerful advocacy tool. Used indiscriminately, it risks becoming background noise. The difference lies in how practitioners deploy it.
First, LaBonte should be used to defeat threshold objections—not to argue entitlement.[46] Its primary function is to prevent correction boards from refusing to engage disability retirement claims based on categorical assumptions about misconduct or court-martial history.[47] Once that barrier is removed, the work of persuasion begins.
Second, practitioners should resist framing claims solely in moral or equitable terms.[48] While equities may matter, LaBonte turns on statutory authority and timing, not sympathy.[49] Claims should be anchored in medical retention standards, contemporaneous evidence of unfitness, and regulatory obligations to refer servicemembers for disability evaluation when warranted.[50]
Third, LaBonte should be used to shape the administrative record with judicial review in mind.[51] Practitioners should press boards to make explicit findings, identify critical dates, and explain why favorable evidence was accepted or rejected.[52] A well-developed record not only improves the chances of success before the board but also preserves meaningful issues for review if relief is denied.[53]
Finally, restraint matters. Courts remain deferential to military decision-making, and arguments that treat LaBonte as outcome-determinative risk alienate the very audience practitioners must persuade.[54] The most effective advocacy treats LaBonte as an opening, not a shortcut.
VI. Conclusion
LaBonte v. United States does not guarantee disability retirement, excuse misconduct, or diminish the deference of military correction boards.[55] Instead, it removes a categorical barrier that has prevented claims from being heard on their merits.[56] For practitioners, LaBonte rewards careful framing, thoughtful record development, and attention to timing and statutory standards.[57] Properly understood, LaBonte opens the door to meaningful review without dictating outcomes.[58] Used thoughtfully, it improves decision-making quality even when relief is denied.
[1] See Labonte v. United States, 150 Fed. Cl. 552, 556–57, 563–64 (2020).
[2] See LaBante v. United States, 43 F.4th 1357, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2022).
[3] See id.
[4] See id.
[5] Doyon v. United States, 58 F.4th 1235, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
[6] See LaBante, 43 F.4th at 1371.
[7] See id.; see also Kelly v. United States, 69 F.4th 887 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (rejecting correction-board reasoning grounded in an unduly narrow view of statutory authority).
[8] See LaBante, 43 F.4th at 1373–74.
[9] See id.
[10] See id. at 1371.
[11] See id.
[12] See id. at 1366–68.
[13] See id.
[14] See id. at 1364–65.
[15] See id.
[16] See id. at 1366–67.
[17] See id. at 1363–64.
[18] See id. at 1367-68.
[19] See id.
[20] See id.
[21] See id.
[22] See id. at 1367–69.
[23] See id. at 1364–67.
[24] See id.
[25] See id.
[26] See id at 1365–66.
[27] See id at 1367.
[28] See id at 1367–69.
[29] See id.
[30] See id.
[31] See id.
[32] See id.; 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
[33] See id. at 1366–67.
[34] See id. at 1367-69.
[35] See id.
[36] See Doyon v. United States, 58 F.4th 1235, 1242–45 (Fed. Cir. 2023).
[37] See LaBonte, 43 F.4th at 1366–69; see also Doyon, 58 F.4th at 1244–46.
[38] See Doyon, 58 F.4th at 1242–44; 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h).
[39] Doyon, 58 F.4th at 1240–43.
[40] See id.
[41] See id. at 1243–46.
[42] See LaBonte, 43 F.4th at 1365–67; see also Doyon, 58 F.4th at 1242–45.
[43] See LaBonte, 43 F.4th at 1366–69; see also Doyon, 58 F.4th at 1243–46.
[44] See LaBonte, 43 F.4th at 1366–69; see also Doyon, 58 F.4th at 1242–46.
[45] See LaBonte, 43 F.4th at 1366–69; see also Doyon, 58 F.4th at 1244–46.
[46] LaBonte, 43 F.4th at 1365–66.
[47] See id.
[48] See id. at 1364–66.
[49] See id.
[50] See id. at 1365–69.
[51] See id.
[52] See id.
[53] See id.
[54] See id.
[55] See id. at 1364–67.
[56] See id.
[57] See id. at 1365–69.
[58] See id.